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RETHINKING BALANCING TESTS IN BLIGHT
CONDEMNATION JURISPRUDENCE
Roderick M. Hills, Jr.∗Φ
A Response to Ilya Somin, Let There Be
Blight: Blight Condemnations in New York after
Goldstein and Kaur, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1193
(2011).
Professor Somin has written an incisive
critique of the New York Court of Appeals’
decisions in Kaur1 and Goldstein,2 the gist of
which is that the Court did not do enough to stop
“highly abusive blight condemnations.”3
There
are, however, two difficulties with the critique.
First, as a matter of legalistic interpretation of
the New York Constitution, the critique is not
very persuasive.
Second, as a matter of policy,
Professor Somin’s proposal is unlikely to be
adopted by any judge influenced by the same
political process that lead to the condemnations
that Professor Somin attacks.
Despite Professor Somin’s short argument to
the contrary, there is nothing in the text or
∗
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Suggested citation: Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Mushy
Balancing Tests in Blight Condemnation Jurisprudence, 39
FORDHAM U RB . L.J. C ITY S QUARE 29 (2012), http://urbanlawjournal.
com/?p=366.
1. Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721
(N.Y. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y.
State Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010).
2. Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164
(N.Y. 2009).
3. Ilya Somin, Let There Be Blight: Blight Condemnations in
New York after Goldstein and Kaur, 38 F ORDHAM U RB. L.J. 1193,
1194 (2011).
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traditions of the New York Constitution requiring
courts to play the role that Professor Somin
suggests. To the contrary, Article XVIII, section
1, the provision on which Professor Somin relies
to urge a more robust judicial policing of eminent
domain, was created to facilitate precisely the
sort of statist interventions on behalf of private
parties that Professor Somin dislikes.
Article
XVIII, section 1 permits condemnations that
eliminate
“substandard
and
insanitary
4
conditions.”
From its inception, however, this
provision was used to eliminate under-populated
but not especially blighted neighborhoods for the
purpose of allowing private firms to improve these
neighborhoods for private purposes.
Take Murray v. LaGuardia, a 1943 decision
that Professor Somin cites for the proposition
that the New York Constitution authorized only the
condemnation of “slums.”5
Professor Somin’s
interpretation
greatly
underestimates
the
capaciousness of the concept of “slum” to the
progressive mind of the 1930s and 1940s: Virtually
any
working
class
neighborhood
with
dense
structures that lacked basic amenities——central
heating and private bathrooms, for instance——could
be regarded as a slum in contemporary parlance.
Murray, for instance, involved the condemnation of
the so-called Gas House District on the Lower East
Side of Manhattan during the 1940s, explicitly to
facilitate Metropolitan Life Insurance Company’s
construction of the gigantic middle-income housing
project known as “Stuyvesant Town.”6 However, the
Gas House District, named for the Consolidated Gas
Company’s facilities that occupied the area, was
not especially noxious; surviving photos show
streets lined with structurally sound shops and

4. N.Y. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1.
5. Murray v. LaGuardia, 52 N.E.2d 884 (N.Y. 1943).
6. See id. at 325.
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apartments.7 As Samuel Zipp’s chapter on the Gas
House District condemnation demonstrates, actual
residents did not want their homes to be
destroyed.8
By the standards of the 1940s, the
buildings in the Gas House District were not
horrible: “[H]ousing conditions were less than
ideal,” with about half the buildings needing
repairs
and
most
without
central
heat
or
bathrooms.9
But, by the standards of the time,
structures without private bathrooms or central
heating were not unusual. As late as 1960, 40% of
houses in the United States lacked central
heating.10 The case for the condemnation was not
that the housing in the Gas House District was
unequivocally worse than average New York City
housing, but rather that the housing could be
improved.
Therefore, the city arranged for the
condemnation of an immense tract of land to
benefit a specific private developer——Met Life——
simply to raise real estate values, provide
middle-class urban housing, and improve welfare
through reduced density.11
In short, the state constitution’s definition
of
eminent
domain
for
slum
clearance,
as
originally understood, allowed condemnations that
transferred
mediocre
but
not
horrible
neighborhoods from one set of private owners to a
known private developer merely for the purpose of
improving the quality of the housing.
This is
exactly the sort of condemnation that Professor
Somin opposes, and yet these condemnations are as
deeply rooted in the history and law of New York
as Stuyvesant Town.

7. See SAMUEL ZIPP, MANHATTAN P ROJECTS : T HE RISE AND F ALL OF U RBAN
RENEWAL IN C OLD W AR N EW Y ORK 90-95 (2010).
8. See id. at 76.
9. Id. at 85.
10. U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
FINANCIAL
CHARACTERISTICS,
http://factfinder.
census.gov/jsp/saff/SAFFInfo.jsp?_pageId=tp14_housing_financi
al (last updated Sept. 17, 2004).
11. See Z IPP, supra note 4, at 77-115.
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If the strictly legal sources——the state
constitution’s text and original understanding——do
not support an aggressive role for New York courts
in policing eminent domain, then what about policy
considerations?
Here, I think that Professor
Somin’s diagnosis stands on stronger ground. But
his prescription——tougher standards for finding
neighborhoods
to
be
“blighted”——seems
less
convincing because the cure is unlikely to be
adopted by the patient and because there are other
medicines that might be more effective and more
palatable.
The best policy argument that courts should
play a more vigorous role in policing eminent
domain is that the costs of false positives
(eminent domain that reduces social welfare)
exceed the costs of false negatives (lack of land
assembly that reduces social welfare) resulting
from either private land markets or more robust
judicial review.
The history of eminent domain
abuse during the era of urban renewal suggests a
number of potential false positives——that is,
governmental
tendencies
to
over-use
eminent
domain.
One can hypothesize a political economy
to explain such over-use where majorities of
voters ignore the social costs of eminent domain
because they affect only a small group of
landowners, while influential elites press for
more land assembly because they will reap the
surpluses from assembly as a result of their
political
connections.
In
theory,
the
compensation paid to condemnees ought to induce
local taxpayers to use eminent domain only when
the benefits exceed the tax burden.12 In practice,
much of eminent domain’s cost is spread across the
entire nation of taxpayers through federal grants,
diffusing the incentive of voters to monitor the

12. For the classic defense of this position, see generally
Thomas Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 C ORNELL L. R EV .
61 (1986).
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costs very carefully.13 Moreover, the measures of
compensation
typically
exclude
lost
business
goodwill and consumers’ subjective value of their
housing, leaving condemnees manifestly undercompensated.14
One
can
plausibly
assume,
therefore, that certain jurisdictions will engage
in too much land assembly at significant social
cost.
The problem is that the alternatives to
judicial
deference
are
not
ideal.
False
negatives, induced by aggressive judicial policing
of local governments’ decisions have costs to the
extent that private land markets do not assemble
urban land at an efficiently high rate.
The
reason for excessively low private assembly is the
familiar holdout problem: If each landowner on a
city block knows that her parcel is necessary for
a private land assembly to go forward, then she
has an incentive to misrepresent the opportunity
costs of foregoing the pre-assembly use of the
land in order to extract whatever surplus is
created by the assembly.
That landowners refuse
to sell even when it is in their interest to do so
is demonstrated by the familiar anecdotes about
disappointed prospective sellers opportunistically
increasing their asking price one time too many,
thereby inducing prospective buyers to simply
build
the
proposed
structure
around
the
recalcitrant holdout’s parcel.15
That similar
tactics might doom cost-justified assemblies is
not difficult to imagine.
So which is more costly——excessive eminent
domain
inadequately
deterred
by
democratic
politics,
or
insufficient
land
assembly
inadequately advanced by the strategic bargaining
13. On the role of federal grants in diminishing the
incentive of local voters to control eminent domain, see
William Fischel, Before Kelo: Federal Grants Encourage
Excessive Use of Eminent Domain, 28 REG. MAG. 32 (2005).
14. See id. at 35.
15. For a litany of such anecdotes lovingly described, see
ANDREW A LPERN & SEYMOUR D URST, N EW Y ORK’ S ARCHITECTURAL HOLDOUTS (1984).
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of buyers and sellers? This is obviously a tricky
empirical question.
I am inclined to side with
Professor Somin in thinking that the costs of the
false positives exceed the costs of the false
negatives. But I suspect that the average state
supreme court judge will not take up Professor
Somin’s invitation to weigh these imponderable
magnitudes. According to Professor Somin, judges
should assess whether there is too much private
influence causing, or too little public benefit
resulting from, the use of eminent domain. It is
difficult to imagine, however, that very many
judges will accept an invitation to deploy such
mushy and policy-laden tests in the interest of
those libertarian values that Professor Somin and
I share. After all, the same political influences
that allegedly lead to excessive use of eminent
domain will also affect the appointment of state
judges.
Why would the political economy that
Professor Somin decries somehow stop at the
courtroom door?
Judges appointed by business
coalitions are likely to trust businessmen who
secure the right to develop condemned tracts.
Judges appointed by planning-oriented politicians
with a penchant for statist reorganization of real
estate patterns are likely to share a trust in
state planning.
The mushy balancing tests urged
by Professor Somin seem well-suited to allowing
judges to do whatever they like.
And what they
like to do, for the most part, is defer to
politicians.
Indeed, some of the tests urged by Professor
Somin are actually self-contradictory. Consider,
first, the idea that judges should be especially
suspicious of condemnations where the identity of
the private developer is known in advance.16
On
16. Justice Kennedy stressed this point in his Kelo
concurrence where he found that the New London Development
Authority’s condemnation of Kelo’s house was not primarily
motivated by a desire to benefit private parties given that
“[t]he identities of most of the private beneficiaries were
unknown at the time the city formulated its plans.” Kelo v.
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this theory, judges should encourage cities to
raze whole city blocks before cities have a firm
commitment from a specific developer, to insure
that the decision to use eminent domain was not
tainted by private influence. But such a “purity
first” approach to land assembly would be madness
from the perspective of sensible planning, another
factor urged by Professor Somin.
Absent a
specific and reliable developer’s commitment, the
assembled land might sit undeveloped for years
before the city can find someone to bear the costs
of improving it.
That Bruce Ratner was involved
from the outset in the development of Atlantic
Yards17 might suggest corruption, but it might also
suggest that the relevant politicians were not
such fools as to think that they could embark on a
major land assembly without firm commitment from a
developer with a track record of success in
managing
commercial
development
in
Brooklyn.
(Ratner
demonstrated
such
success
by
his
developing Metrotech Center, a few blocks west of
Atlantic Yards). By contrast, the New London site
now sits barren and empty as a result of the New
London Development Authority’s failure to secure a
specific development commitment from a reliable
developer up front.18
In short, I doubt that many state judges will
employ any of the four factors urged by Professor
Somin to place major constraints on eminent
domain.
The factors are simply too mushy and
policy-laden.
Even a judge making a good-faith
effort to deploy these factors might balk at
distinguishing between a municipality’s careful

City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 493 (2005) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
17. See
Atlantic
Yards,
N.Y.
TIMES,
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/
timestopics/subjects/a/atlantic_yards_brooklyn/index.html
(last updated Mar. 17, 2011).
18. Patrick McGeehan, Pfizer to Leave City That Won Land-Use
Case,
N.Y.
T IMES
(Nov.
12,
2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/13/nyregion/13pfizer.html.
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selection of a reliable developer in advance of a
project (the hallmark of good planning) and the
municipality’s being unduly influenced by that
same developer (the hallmark of corruption).
What other reforms might be both more
effective and more palatable to the policymakers
(judges, state legislators, city leaders, etc.)
that must, after all, install the reforms? Here
is a modest suggestion: Give condemnees their
attorney’s and expert witness fees whenever the
compensation award after trial is higher than the
initial good-faith offer made by the condemnor in
advance of condemnation.
Such a reform has the
advantage of employing the self-interest of that
most assiduous breed of lobbyists——trial lawyers——
toward the cause of constraining eminent domain.
Moreover, the award of fees will create an
incentive
for
the
initial
offers
to
be
sufficiently high that, in an age of federal grant
austerity, the likelihood of excessive use of
eminent domain will be reduced, if not eliminated.
Finally, the fee approach uses a crisp, bright
line rule without mushy definitions of “blight,”
“private influence,” or “public benefit.”
Is it the perfect antidote to the overuse of
eminent domain? No——there is no perfect antidote.
One could, of course, eliminate all eminent
domain.
But, that would exclude the indisputably
necessary condemnations that could be preserved by
painstakingly
defining
when
an
area
is
uncontroversially
noxious
enough
to
justify
eminent domain.
Yet, this sort of detailed code
might likely lead to false negatives——that is,
failure to use eminent domain even when the status
quo is merely shabby rather than noxious and the
proposed assembly is a reasonably good idea.
After
all,
Stuyvesant
Town
seems
like
an
improvement on the Gas House District.
Do we
really want a test that would make such a change
impossible?

